current account deficit. Bolder exchange rate action should be accompanied by an expansion and redirection of government expenditure toward weaknesses in China's social safety net-so as to reduce the incentives for such high precautionary saving. The US Treasury should indicate to the Chinese that henceforth it will consider movements in China's global current account surplus, in China's real effective exchange rate, and in China's monthly intervention in the exchange market as the key benchmarks for assessing progress on external adjustment and on currency reform. The Treasury should press for putting the exchange rate issue at the top of the agenda for the May 2007 meeting of the Strategic Economic Dialogue and for keeping it there until greater progress is made. Failure by China to drastically reduce its large-scale, one-way intervention in the exchange market should result in a finding of "currency manipulation" current account surplus in the world in absolute dollar terms and one that is larger relative to the size of the economy than even the troublesome US global current account deficit. Indicator number two. China's real effective exchange rate-widely regarded as a more comprehensive and superior measure of China's overall competitive position than the nominal exchange rate between the US dollar and the Chinese RMB-has actually 2 Note too that this large expansion of China's global surplus has occurred during a period when world oil prices have increased sharply (China is a net oil importer) and when China's growth rate of real GDP has been very rapid (pushing up its demand for imports). 3 The US global current account deficit in 2006 was $857 billion-or 6.5 percent of our GDP. China's global current account surplus in 2006-expressed as a share of its GDP-was also considerably larger than was Japan's in the period of considerable bilateral trade friction with the United States. But China's real effective exchange rate has moved in a direction opposite to what is needed. Some would have you believe that because the RMB-US dollar rate has appreciated by about 6½ percent since June of 2005-from 8.28 RMB to the dollar to 4 An "effective" exchange rate index is a weighted average of the country's exchange rate against its major trading partners, where the weights on individual currencies are typically related to the importance of that country in the home country's trade. A "real" exchange rate index adjusts movements in the nominal exchange rate for differences in inflation rates between the home and foreign country, since higher inflation represents a decline in price competitiveness just like an appreciation of the home currency. A "real effective" exchange rate index combines these two features. 5 Lardy [2007] has argued that even these indicators of the real effective exchange rate understate the improvement in China's competitiveness over the 2002-06 period because the price indices used to construct them include some nontradable goods and hence don't give adequate weight to rapid productivity growth in China's export industries. He notes that even while the RMB-dollar exchange rate was appreciating, the price of US imports from China was falling. Taking account of the inflation differential between the United States and China and of export productivity improvements not reflected in broad Chinese price indices, Lardy estimates that the RMB-dollar nominal exchange rate needed to appreciate by roughly 5 to 6 percent a year just to keep China's competitive position constant in the US market over the 2004-06 period. 7.73 (as of April 25, 2007)-we must be making real progress on the exchange rate front.
The sad truth is that the RMB is now grossly undervalued-on the order of 30 percent or more against an average of China's trading partners and 40 percent or more against the US dollar-and that the appreciation of the RMB that has taken place to date against the dollar is completely inadequate to make a real dent in this huge surplus. For estimates and analysis of the undervaluation of the RMB that show the undervaluation to be quite large, see: Goldstein and Lardy [2006] ; Goldstein [2006b Goldstein [ , 2004 ; Cline [2007] ; Anderson [2006a]; Frankel [2006] ; Benassy-Quere et al [2006] ; and Coudert and Couharde [2005] . Admittedly, there are also quite a few studies that find RMB undervaluation to be either small or subject to a very wide margin of uncertainty-see, for example, Cheung et al. [2007] , Barell et al. [2007] , and Dunaway et al. [2006] -but I regard this latter set of estimates as less reliable. 7 As part of the July 2005 reform, China also pledged to manage the RMB "with reference to a basket of currencies" rather than against the US dollar alone. Here too, progress has been minimal; see Frankel and Wei [2007] and Goldstein and Lardy [2006] . When the monetary authorities "sterilize" the effects of exchange market intervention, they take offsetting actions (e.g., selling bonds or bills to the public) to ensure that changes in international reserves don't have much effect on the domestic money supply (and hence on the domestic inflation rate). It is often argued that if countries engage in heavy exchange market intervention, then they should not be allowed to also engage in heavy sterilization-lest they block the changes in competitiveness that are necessary for effective balance-of-payments adjustment. China has been engaging in both heavy exchange market intervention and heavy sterilization of increases in its international reserves. 10 Yes, there have been some welcome steps to create a market infrastructure and financial instruments that would assist the development of a floating exchange rate for the RMB (e.g., the introduction of interbank foreign currency trading and allowing banks to act as market-makers in foreign currency)-but these steps pale in significance next to the bottom-line, external imbalance and real exchange rate developments emphasized above. 11 A recent (April 17, 2007) The practical upshot of this is that the international community is operating without an enforced international code of conduct on exchange rate policies. Indeed, it's as if a new IMF charter has been informally agreed under which there are two guidelines on exchange rates. Guideline I covers the obligation of countries; it states: "member countries shall do as they wish on exchange rate policies." Guideline II covers the obligations of the IMF for exchange rate surveillance: it states: "Sorry, it's not our job."
III. Why It Matters
If progress on correcting China's external imbalance and on removing the large undervaluation of the RMB has been very slow or nonexistent, some might say that it doesn't matter that much. I beg to differ.
Obviously, China's exchange rate policies matter most to China itself. The
Chinese authorities have concluded for good reasons that they want to move from an investment and export-led growth strategy to a more balanced path that is driven by consumption and domestic demand. 12 They also would like to move toward a more independent monetary policy, to continue to strengthen their banking system, and to be regarded as a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system, with a role commensurate with China's growing weight in the world economy.
But China's seriously undervalued and manipulated exchange rate puts at risk achievement of all these worthy objectives. 13 It's hard to restrain investment and to reduce the volatility of aggregate demand growth when you can't raise interest rates by much because doing so might attract large speculative capital inflows-thereby putting stronger upward pressure on the exchange rate. It's hard to divert resources away from exports and to reduce excess capacity in important tradeable goods industries when a highly undervalued RMB is sending price signals that go in the opposite direction. It's hard to improve the performance of banks when they have to hold an ever larger share of relatively low-yielding sterilization bonds in their portfolios, when they are subject to repeated increases in (low-yielding) reserve requirements, when an undervalued exchange rate generates large increases in international reserves-some of which, even with heavy sterilization operations still finds its way into excessively rapid increases in bank loans-and when central authorities tell local credit officers how much and to whom to lend (whenever credit growth becomes excessive). 14 And it's hard to maintain reliable access to industrial countries' markets for your exports and foreign investments-and indeed, to convince others that you merit a larger leadership role in helping to manage the international monetary system-when you insist (contrary to your 12 See Lardy [2006] . 13 See Goldstein [2004] for a fuller analysis of why an undervalued and manipulated RMB is contrary to China's own long-term interest. 14 The PBOC has raised the reserve requirement ratio seven times since June 2006. Also, see Dobson and Kashyap [2006] on the still significant effect of politicized lending decisions by state-owned banks to stateowned companies.
membership obligations at the IMF) that your exchange rate policy is solely a matter of your national sovereignty and that others should accept a timetable for your external adjustment that might run into decades rather than the medium term. States can and should take on its own to improve our aggregate savings-investment imbalance-especially efforts to produce a durable reduction in the US budget deficit over the medium term.
Although their impact is often exaggerated, China
Still, it is a mistake to downplay the helpful role that exchange rate changes in Asia can make to bringing about an improvement in the US external imbalance and to reducing the risk of a dollar crash and a hard landing of the US economy. Here, a significant real appreciation of the RMB could be an important catalyst. First, we could get a most unfavorable "demonstration effect" for currency policies in the rest of emerging markets. Suppose the lesson of China's exchange rate policies comes to be seen as follows: use a combination of heavy and persistent intervention in the exchange market, plus large-scale sterilization operations, and you too will be able to generate and sustain a highly undervalued real exchange rate that will be imbalances in not an "either or" one (i.e., exchange rate changes alone "or" changes in domestic demand growth relative to output growth alone); it is instead for a combination of the two; see Mussa [2005] . 16 These estimates of the absolute dollar effect of Asian currency appreciations on the US current account have grown over time, reflecting, inter alia, the growth of US GDP and the larger size of the US traded goods sector relative to the rest of the economy.
advantageous for achieving rapid economic growth. In such a case, we would see in the future much less real exchange rate appreciation in surplus countries and a smaller role for exchange rates in the correction of external imbalances. This would be distinctly bad news for the global economy and for the US economy.
The second risk is that China's currency manipulation will eventually lead to a retaliatory trade policy response in the United States-and perhaps in Europe and Japan as well. This will in turn destroy prospects for achieving what I have previously called a win-win "grand bargain" between the industrial countries and the emerging economies.
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In that grand bargain, the emerging economies would get good access to the large markets in the industrial countries for their exports and their foreign investments and they would obtain "chairs and shares" (greater representation and voting power) in the groups and institutions that manage the world economy that were consistent with their growing economic weight. In exchange, the industrial countries would get improved access to the growing markets in the emerging economies as well as a pledge from the emerging economies that the latter would play by the agreed "international rules of the game" on currencies, trade, and international property rights.
To believe that China can continue with its exchange market intervention policies for another say, five years and maintain a highly undervalued exchange rate that provides what Fed Chairman Bernanke rightly dubbed a "subsidy" to its exporters and still enjoy uninterrupted access to the US market is, I think, a fantasy. 18 Eventually, patience will run out and countervailing measures of one kind or another will be adopted-much to the Bernanke [2006] . 19 In this connection, Senator Schumer, testifying on March 28, 2007 before the Senate Finance Committee's hearing on the role of currency in the US-China relationship, announced his intention (in that is in practice unreachable and rules "no foul" even after the third largest trading country in the world intervenes in amounts equal to 10 percent of GDP for three years running, sees its global current account surplus grow eight to ninefold in five years, has its real effective exchange rate moving in the wrong direction, and is simultaneously experiencing booming economic growth-then one shouldn't be surprised if the legislature comes to view those reports as a whitewash. external and internal balance simultaneously. 22 If there was nevertheless a concern that significant RMB appreciation would be too contractionary, there is the attractive option of pairing it with an increase in government expenditures directed at health, education, and pensions. Such a strengthening of the social safety net would reduce the need for such large precautionary saving and would contribute, along with the demand effects of increased government expenditure, to a larger reduction in China's external imbalance. Accepting the principle that countries should be allowed to manipulate the exchange rate so as to boost employment would make it impossible to discourage "beggar they neighbor" exchange rate policies at the international level: all countries have full employment objectives and it is not clear why some countries concerns in this area should be elevated above those of others. Why, for example, should an extra worker employed in China's export industry count for more than an extra one in Bangladesh, or Egypt, or South Carolina?
IV. Myths That Thwart Progress

A second (erroneous) contention is that an appreciation of the RMB much beyond the rate of recent years would cause major disruptions to China's financial sector, particularly its banks, and that bolder exchange rate action has to wait until China's financial system is much stronger than today.
As outlined earlier, I think huge reserve accumulation, the need to place lowyielding sterilization bonds with the banks, and the reliance on window guidance to manage bank lending, actually makes large exchange rate undervaluation the enemy-not the ally-of bank reform. In the first quarter of 2007, the growth of bank lending was again so rapid (as it was in 2003 and the first part of 2004) that half of the ceiling increase for 2007 as a whole has already occurred.
All of the major financial crises in emerging economies over the past dozen years or so have been characterized by large currency mismatches on the eve of the crisis. 28 But
China's banks and their customers are much less vulnerable on the currency mismatch front than were the earlier crisis countries: China is a net creditor-not a net debtor-in its overall foreign exchange position; where bank capital is required to be held in dollars, reports indicate that most of the currency risk is being hedged in the market; China's exporters have lower debt-equity ratios than firms in other sectors; and most of the largest exporting firms are foreign-owned and do not obtain the bulk of their financing in China's domestic market. The principal challenge facing Chinese banks is how to increase profitability as China's overall financial market is being further liberalized. Owing in large part to a high incidence of bad loans, the return on equity in China's banks has historically been extremely low. Going forward, the Chinese authorities have indicated that they want to expand the roles of commercial paper, bond, and equity markets. The factors typically cited for why RMB appreciation would be ineffective include low wage rates and high profit margins (that would supposedly allow exporters to "eat" the revaluation without raising export prices), a high import content of exports (stemming from China's role as a regional processing center), and (alleged) low price elasticities of demand for both exports and imports. margins are considerably higher in the newer and fastest growing export industries (e.g., aircraft parts, ships and boats, automobiles, telecom equipment, etc). But the telling point
is that there appears to be little evidence that profit margins move systematically to offset the effects of nominal exchange rate changes on export prices (as would be the case if there was pervasive "pricing to market' behavior). Mirroring its' role as a key processing center, China does have a very high import content of exports-in the neighborhood of 30 to 35 percent. An RMB revaluation thus lowers the cost of imported inputs and generates a smaller increase in export prices than would be the case if exports had no import content. This does not make exchange rate changes ineffective; it just means it takes a larger revaluation to achieve a given change in the trade balance than in the noimport-content case.
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If the sum of the (absolute value) of the price elasticities of demand for exports and imports is not greater than one, then (according to the so-called Marshall-Lerner condition) a revaluation (devaluation) will not cause the trade balance to deteriorate (improve). 34 But is highly likely that the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied for China's trade because the manufactured goods that form the bulk of China's exports are typically quite price-elastic, while the goods that China imports are also produced in China. 35 Cline [2007] makes the assumption that the import and export price elasticities of demand are each equal to unity, while Anderson [2006b] assumes that the sum of the elasticities is just slightly above one. Coudert and Couharde [2005] find that with an import price elasticity of -0.9 and an export price elasticity of -0.5, the Marshall-Lerner condition is easily satisfied. I think the preferred approach should be to do trade-balance exercises using a range of plausible values for such price elasticities (e.g. -0.5 to -1.0 on the import side and -0.7 to -2.0 on the export side). 36 Efforts to estimate such price elasticities on Chinese data-rather than to infer the answer from estimates for China's 33 See Goldstein [2004] . 34 If trade is imbalanced, one also has to take the export-import ratio into account in determining whether the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied; this makes it somewhat easier to satisfy the condition in China's case. 35 See Goldstein and Khan [1985] for a survey of empirical estimates of export and import price elasticities, and Marquez and Schindler [2006] and Coudert and Couharde [2005] for a review of empirical work on the effect of exchange rate changes on China's trade balance. 36 Reflecting such a range of plausible price elasticities, I have typically reported likely RMB misalignment in ranges as well (e.g. 15-25 percent, 20-35 percent, etc); see, for example, Goldstein [2004 Goldstein [ ,2006b and Goldstein and Lardy [2006] .
trading partners-are just in their infancy and have had to contend with poor price data, relatively short sample periods, and large structural and cyclical changes. Thus far, such studies have been more successful in isolating relative-price effects on the export side than on the import side. 37 If there is an emerging consensus, I would say that a ballpark estimate is that a 10 percent appreciation in the real effective exchange rate of the RMB will induce a deterioration in China's trade balance of between 2 and 3½ percent of GDP 38 -with the low (high) end of the range coming from studies that assume relatively low (high) price elasticities of demand and relatively large (small) export price effects from imported inputs.
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If the demand for China's exports was really as inelastic as some of the critics of RMB revaluation contend, it's hard to see why the Chinese authorities would be so resistant to an immediate and sizeable revaluation-for in that case, the higher foreigncurrency price of Chinese exports would produce an increase-not a decrease-in total export revenue.
Myth number four is that the IMF should not act as a global umpire for exchange rate policy-notwithstanding the mandate in its charter-because doing so would conflict
with the IMF's role as "trusted advisor" to its member countries. But why should the two roles conflict unless the Fund were giving countries advice on exchange rate policy that violated its own currency manipulation guidelines? And even if the two roles did conflict, why is not the umpire role the more important one? Most games have two teams, two coaches, and at least one umpire-not two teams, three coaches, and no umpire.
When there is no umpire, the quality of play invariably suffers. The IMF is the only institution with the mandate and resources to carry out the umpire role successfully; in contrast, there are many others who can act as a trusted advisor to countries. 37 See, for example, Marquez and Schindler [2006] and Shu and Yip [2006] . 38 Using such figures for the trade balance effects of an exchange rate change, it is easy to see why one arrives at a large (30 percent or more) estimated undervaluation for the RMB if the assumed objective is to eliminate China's existing global-current account surplus of 9 percent of GDP, or to have China run a global current account deficit (of say, 1 ½ percent of GDP) to offset its surplus on net capital flows. been engaging in manipulation, it reduces the dispute to a bilateral difference of opinion about how fast China should move on increasing the flexibility of the RMB-with China preferring a slow, gradual approach and the US favoring a more rapid one. After 25 years of favorable experience with a gradualist approach to policy reform in other areas, the Chinese authorities think they know better which approach works best and favor their own view. In contrast, if China were found to be engaging in currency manipulation-not just by the US Treasury but also by the IMF-it would send a strong signal that the international community regards China's exchange rate policy not only as ill-advised but also as illegal and as counter to China's membership obligations in the IMF. The latter finding is apt to be a more powerful catalyst for a policy change in China than is a simple difference of opinion on the optimal speed of moving to a higher RMB. But it will be difficult to persuade the IMF to conduct a serious inquiry into China's alleged currency manipulation practices if the US Treasury itself rules repeatedly in its own reports to the US Congress that no currency manipulation has in fact taken place.
Yet a fifth weak argument is that having US
V. What to Do?
If recent developments in China's exchange rate policy are worrisome and if the arguments against faster and bolder policy actions are weak, what should China, the United States, and the IMF do to prevent a train wreck from taking place sometime over the next few years?
The priority for China should be to deliver right away a meaningful "down payment" of a 10 to 15 appreciation of the RMB from its current level. This could be accomplished either by a step revaluation of the RMB or by cutting way back on China's exchange market intervention so that the RMB floated upwards. If China had acted in
2003-04 to deal in a timely manner with its growing current account surplus and with the RMB undervaluation, it could perhaps have erased the misalignment in one go. 40 But the undervaluation of the RMB has now become so large, that a phased approach to exchange rate adjustment has become necessary. That said, it should be clear by now that a very modest rate of upward crawl of the RMB relative to the US dollar is not going to solve the problem. 41 If the dollar depreciates in real effective terms by say, 15 to 20 percent over the next two to three years time, then say, an annual 5 percent appreciation of the RMB with respect to the dollar is not going to deliver the needed large appreciation in China's real effective exchange rate, that is, the RMB's path in real effective terms will be heavily influenced by the decline in the dollar. China has to escape from being way behind the curve on exchange rate adjustment. Drawing out the needed appreciation of the RMB over too long also carries that risk that once a nontrivial upward crawl of the RMB comes to be widely expected by markets, it could induce large speculative capital inflows. All of this is why Nick Lardy and I have long called for a significant step revaluation in the RMB as the first part of "two-step" currency reform for China.
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Bolder exchange rate action should also be accompanied by an expansion and redirection of government expenditure toward weaknesses in China's social safety net, that is, toward the health, education, and pension areas-so as to reduce the incentives for such high precautionary saving. China should also abandon the rhetoric that the RMB exchange rate is a matter of Chinese national sovereignty and should reaffirm its commitment to the exchange rate policy obligations placed on all members of the IMF.
For its part, the United States needs to clarify and to strengthen its message on what it wants China to do on exchange rate policy, while simultaneously demonstrating its willingness to make a larger contribution of its own toward reducing global payments imbalances.
The US Treasury should indicate to the Chinese that henceforth it will consider movements in China's global current account surplus, in China's real effective exchange rate, and in the monthly amount of China's intervention in the exchange market as the key benchmark indicators in assessing China's progress on external adjustment and on currency reform. The Treasury should press for putting the exchange rate issue at the very top of the agenda for next meeting in May 2007 of the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) with China, and for keeping it there at future meetings of the SED until there is much greater progress in reducing both China's global external imbalance and its exchange rate undervaluation. The US authorities should also seek to marshal support from both other industrial countries and large emerging economies for establishing the Fund as the global umpire for exchange rate surveillance-recognizing that the alternatives are apt to be either a "free for all" on exchange rate policy or a patchwork of disjointed manipulation findings and trade policy responses from national legislatures. As part of this role, the Fund would be expected to make more frequent use of its "special consultation" tool whenever either another country or Fund staff raised questions about potential currency manipulation; the Fund would also begin issuing its own semi-annual report on exchange rate policies. Until such a time as the Fund assumes this role, the US Treasury should continue to issue its twice-yearly reports to Congress on international economic and exchange rate policies-but with the expectation that failure by China to make a significant change in its exchange rate policy would result in a finding of "currency manipulation" in the May 2007 report. 43 It is regrettable that at least so far US Treasury Secretary Paulson has given higher priority to policy proposals that lie outside the realm of exchange rate policy (e.g., reforming China's capital markets). While reforms and improvements in China's capital and financial markets would offer many dividends in the long term-including to US financial service firms that want to be more deeply involved in China's financial development, such reforms are not a necessary precondition for making faster progress on China's exchange rate and external imbalance problems; nor should one discount the distortions and competitive disadvantages faced by other segments of the US economy due to China's real exchange rate undervaluation.
As suggested earlier, the Chinese exchange rate problem is part of the wider issue of achieving a better and more equitable pattern of burden-sharing in correcting global payments imbalances. To ensure that the US approach to this problem is "even handed,"
the US authorities should assure the Chinese (and others) that the same benchmarks and methodology used to evaluate progress on external adjustment and exchange rate policy in China will be applied to other economies-be they industrial economies or emerging markets. Equally important, the United States should indicate that it is prepared to offer a new longer-term plan for greater and more durable fiscal consolidation in the United
States. This in turn should give more confidence to other countries and to private markets that the United States is addressing adequately its low national saving rate while making room for an expansion in US net exports that would accompany a depreciation in the real effective exchange rate of the dollar.
Last but not least, the IMF should return to its roots by taking up in earnest the role that its founders set out for it as the global umpire for exchange rate policies. It should be apparent by now that the "multilateral consultation process," launched with much fanfare by IMF management in April 2006, is no substitute for that umpire role.
The WTO is already serving in a parallel role as global umpire for trade policies.
Through the rulings of its adjudication panels, it is becoming clearer over time what is
and what is not internationally acceptable trade policy. A similar exercise has to begin for exchange rate policy at the IMF. The best protection against protectionist trade policies is the assurance that a competent, unbiased international umpire is considering seriously G-7 colleagues and the IMF of its intention to label China as a currency manipulator in its next report to the US Congress (unless China makes a significant down payment in correcting its RMB undervaluation); see Bergsten [2007] .
potential abuses of exchange rate policy and issuing fair, well-reasoned findings. A good place to begin that exercise would be with the two controversial cases of the Chinese RMB and the Japanese yen. Such an exercise would be helpful in clarifying, for example, whether the undervaluation of the Japanese yen should be regarded differently than the undervaluation of the RMB because the Japanese authorities have not been engaging in large-scale, prolonged, one-way intervention in exchange markets since the first quarter of 2004, whereas the Chinese authorities have been doing so for several years running.
There is no point in having a set of internationally agreed guidelines for IMF surveillance of exchange rates if these guidelines are not enforced.
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VI. Concluding Remarks
To sum up, the role of currency in the US-China relationship has not been handled well over the past four years. The primary responsibility for this unsatisfactory state of affairs lies with China itself. The Chinese authorities have failed to deal decisively with their rising external imbalance and the growing undervaluation of their currency and they have not honored their obligations on exchange rate policies as a member of the IMF. But the United States and the IMF have hardly covered themselves with glory either on solving these problems. The US Treasury's almost exclusive reliance on "quiet diplomacy," the vague pleas for "greater flexibility of exchange rates in countries with large current account surpluses" instead of calls for an immediate and significant appreciation in the real effective exchange rate of the RMB, and the tortured reasoning to justify a conclusion that China has not intended to "manipulate" its exchange rate (when all evidence pointed to the contrary)-have sent weak signals to China and have produced meager results. 45 In addition, the United States has not done enough on fiscal policy consolidation to make a sufficient contribution to reducing our own large savinginvestment imbalance. Meanwhile, the IMF has been largely "asleep at the wheel" in carrying out its own obligation to exercise "firm surveillance" over the exchange rate 44 I would also favor dropping "intent" language from the IMF's exchange rate surveillance mandate and guidelines since it has recently been used an excuse for inaction by the Fund and the US Treasury-rather than being interpreted reasonably as its authors intended. 45 The "greater flexibility" mantra has been a favorite in repeated G-7 communiques and in statements by US Treasury officials.
policies of its member countries. 46 There is no such thing as "no fault" exchange rate surveillance and no set of exchange rate guidelines will work in the absence of the will to enforce those guidelines. All things considered, a different approach is needed if we are to achieve greater progress in reducing global payments imbalances and in deterring trade policy actions that would be in no country's best interests. In this paper, I have outlined what an alternative approach might be and why I think it could generate better results.
